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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD-
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF INFORMATION
AVAILABILITY
ROBERT K. PEZOLD*
S INCE its inception in 1966, the National Transportation Safety
Board has had primary responsibility for the investigation of
all aircraft accidents occurring within the territorial limits of the
United States To the litigants in a civil tort litigation arising from
an accident, one of the most crucial functions of the NTSB is the
investigation and determination of the "probable cause"3 of each
accident at a public hearing,' since this greatly simplifies their dis-
covery procedures. Because of restrictions placed on the avail-
ability of information' concerning an accident, and the failure to
make provision for participation by possible future plaintiffs in
any phase of the investigation," however, the course and conduct
of the public hearing assume an importance to the future litigants
which is neither recognized nor provided for by NTSB. It is the
purpose of this article to review the effects of the restrictions on
access to information, the continued viability of the policy justifica-
tions for the limited participation of some parties, and to propose
* Mr. Pezold received his J.D. degree from the University of Tulsa Law School
in 1974. He is presently Trial and Defense Counsel, JAGC, USN.
IDepartment of Transportation Act, 80 Stat. 931, 49 U.S.C. § 1655 (1970)
[hereinafter NTSB].
2 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 701, 72 Stat. 781, as amended, 76 Stat. 921
(1962), 49 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
249 C.F.R. § 400.45 (1967) "Probable cause" in the sense used herein is
meant to mean the "probable cause in fact" of the accident, as distinguished from
the probable cause in the sense used in the criminal law.
'Investigation of non-fatal accidents involving non-air carrier aircraft weighing
less than 12,500 lbs. gross weight have been delegated to the Federal Aviation
Administration.
249 C.F.R. §S 435.1-6 (1968).
6 Id. S 431.6.
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alternative courses which may better fulfill the unique require-
ments of all concerned.
HISTORY
What has become the NTSB had its inception in the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938,' which, among other things, created the
Air Safety Board, the predecessor of NTSB. The Air Safety Board
was a subordinate branch of the Civil Aeronautics Authority
(CAA), with the functional responsibility of air accident investi-
gation.8 "The Air Safety Board had the power to investigate acci-
dents, but no power to institute remedial measures. It could only
make recommendations to the five-member Authority (CAA).""
The subordinate nature of the Air Safety Board vis-a-vis the CAA,
when considered in light of the independence most commentators
assumed necessary for a satisfactory air accident investigation pro-
gram, created a conflict of interest which was early recognized by
the Congress."0 The response was the Reorganization Plan of
1940,11 which transferred the investigative, economic regulatory,
and rulemaking functions to the newly created Civil Aeronautics
Board. The core "conflict of interest," however, remained, because
the investigatory function was not yet independent.
The phenomenal growth of civil aviation in the decade follow-
ing the Second World War made it evident to the Congress that
new legislation was required to deal with problems then facing the
industry. Congress responded with the Federal Aviation Act of
1958.1" The primary purpose of the Act was to create an indepen-
dent agency called the Federal Aviation Administration13 which
'Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542
(1970).
'Hearings on S. 3010 Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Government Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 197 (1966) [hereinafter Senate
Hearings].
I Id. at 198.
10 Comment, A Critical Analysis of the Department of Transportation, 33 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 314 (1967) [hereinafter Analysis].
" As a result of this reorganization, a Cabinet-level division of the Department
of Commerce, the Civil Aeronautics Authority, was to administer civil aviation.
1249 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970).
" Hereinafter FAA.
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would assume several of the CAB's responsibilities." The CAB,
however, was to continue as an independent agency, with responsi-
bility for economic regulation of the industry as well as aviation
safety. The air safety function was expanded by the Act to include
exclusive authority to investigate aviation accidents and to deter-
mine the probable cause.1 It should further be noted that this
responsibility now lay with the Board itself, rather than the Bureau
of Safety within the CAB.
With few exceptions6 the separation of functions between the
FAA and the CAB proved to be quite successful. So successful, in
fact, that the decision of the Administration, in the Department
of Transportation Act," to spin off the safety function of the CAB
and attach it functionally to the Secretary of Transportation, re-
ceived much criticism within the industry." This criticism, how-
ever, was countered by the assertions that an independent safety
investigation arm could function well in either environment" and
provide a substantial benefit since the techniques utilized in air
accident investigation would be readily applicable to investigation
of accidents occurring in other modes of transportation." As a
'4 Comment, 28 U. KAN. CrrY L. REV. 35 (1960) states that the FAA was to
have the following authority:
(1) establish, maintain and operate air navigation facilities, and
provide for the consolidation of research and development of
such facilities,
(2) develop and operate a common system of air traffic control and
navigation for the safe and efficient use of the airspace by both
civil and military aircraft,
(3) promulgate, administer and enforce safety regulations for the
manufacture, operation and flight of aircraft, and
(4) provide for the promotion, encouragement, and development
of civil aeronautics both in the United States and abroad.
"49 U.S.C. § 1443 (1970).
14 See generally, Analysis.
"Department of Transportation Act, 5 6(d), 80 Stat. 938 (1968), 49 U.S.C.
51655 (1970).
"1 Hearings on H.R. 13200 Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 213 et seq. [hereinafter Hear-
ings].
"Statement of William F. McKee, then Administrator of the FAA:
As we understand it, regardless of where the [aircraft accident in-
vestigation function] was in the Department of Commerce, it will
be done separately and independently from the FAA and we sub-
scribe to that principle.
Hearings 138.
"o Senate Hearings at 184, 741.
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consequence, the air accident investigative function came to reside
where it remains today, in the NTSB, an independent' repository
specifically designed"2 to contain that function.
FUNCTIONING OF THE NTSB
The functions of the NTSB germane to this article are: to pro-
mote safety in transportation; to determine the probable cause of
transportation accidents; to report the facts, conditions and cir-
cumstances relating to such accidents; to make regulations con-
cerning the prevention of such accidents; to make recommendations
concerning rules, regulations and procedures for the conduct of
such investigations; to make "such (accident) reports public as
may be deemed by it to be in the public interest . .,,"" To carry
out its function of determining probable cause, the NTSB has been
granted statutory powers of an unusual scope. These powers in-
clude, but are not limited to: examining and testing of entire air-
craft as well as their component systems; having sole access to the
remains of aircraft accidents; holding of hearings on accidents and
other topics; and issuance of subpoenas."'
To afford the reader a more complete overview of the interac-
tions of the functions of the NTSB with regard to an air carrier
accident, the following scenario is offered. On a clear, cold January
evening a Boeing 747 vanishes from the radar scope of the Wash-
ington Air Traffic Control Center during an en route descent' to
Dulles International Airport. Radio contact is lost simultaneously.
Within an hour the Virginia State Highway Patrol confirms re-
ports that an explosion on a farm near Manassas was caused by
the 747. In addition to the crew of the aircraft, 273 passengers
are dead.
Within an hour the NTSB, which will control the accident in-
2 Id. at 270.
- 49 U.S.C. 1654 (1970).
-49 C.F.R. § 400.3 (1967); Department of Transportation Act, § 5, 80 Stat.
935, 936, 49 U.S.C. 5 1654.
2449 C.F.R. § 400-40 (1967).
2 An enroute descent is one made largely at the pilot's discretion, after re-
ceiving ATC approval, and usually made along the normal route of the flight. It
is a much-used procedure that simplifies handling and reduces time delays incident
to terminal arrival.
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vestigation" through its Bureau of Aviation Safety, has been in-
formed of the accident, and has commenced the "investigative"
phase. This first part of a three-phase process will be followed by
the "public hearing" phase and the "analysis" phase, which will be
dealt with in order. A team consisting of a member of the Board,
the investigator in charge, technical specialists, NTSB accident
investigators, and a public affairs officer is dispatched to the scene
of the accident. Upon arrival, their first task is to isolate the
wreckage of the aircraft."' As soon thereafter as time allows the
investigator-in-charge' will form committees and designate parties
to the investigation."' Other than the FAA, whose presence is
mandatory," the parties to a field investigation normally include
the Airline Pilots Association, the air line, the manufacturer, and
agencies "who can provide suitably qualified personnel who will
actively assist in the field investigation.""2 Conspicuous by their
absence from the group of "interested parties" to the field investiga-
tion are any representatives of the passengers of that aircraft be-
cause of the operation of section 431.6(A) of Title 14 of the Code
of Federal Regulations, which states in pertinent part: "No party
to the field investigation . . . shall be represented by any person
who also represents claimants or insurers." One might logically
inquire at this juncture about the policy reasons by which the
representatives of a possibly negligent manufacturer, or pilot, or
air controller are made parties to an investigation, and thereby
granted a clear and rather obvious opportunity to further and pro-
tect their own interests, while those seeking to protect the inter-
ests of the most seriously wronged are explicitly excluded.
By far the largest part of the actual investigative work is per-
formed by the various committees consisting of an NTSB specialist,
as chairman, and representatives of the particular party in interest.
The function of each committee is to determine the "facts, condi-
tions and circumstances"'" relating to its area of investigation which
may have a bearing on the probable cause of the accident. In the
"49 C.F.R. § 400.25 (1967).
271d. S 430.10.
2849 C.F.R. § 431.11 (1971).
9Id. 5 431.13.
30Id. 5 431.6(b).
11 Id. § 431.13(a).
3I Id. S 431.5.
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absence of specific information pointing at the outset to some
particular cause of the accident, the following committees may be
established:
1. Debriefing of Witnesses-This committee has the responsi-
bility for locating, debriefing and obtaining statements from any
individuals having witnessed personally the accident or any of its
surrounding circumstances. If available, particularly if from knowl-
edgeable sources such as other pilots, this information is quite
valuable: firstly, because it may significantly narrow the scope of
the investigation; and secondly, because the external frame of
reference may provide information not available even to surviving
occupants of the aircraft. In the more probable event that the
available witnesses are "technologically unsophisticated," special
attention and care should be given to the formation of the ques-
tions put to these witnesses to insure that no preconception or bias
is introduced.
2. Examination of Flight Recorder Data-Many aircraft pres-
ently carry a flight recorder, which makes a chronological record
of the readings of certain "essential" instruments, such as altimeter,
air speed indicator, vertical acceleration, and heading." This com-
mittee is responsible for reconstructing the flight from this informa-
tion and for analysing the information contained in the recorder.
Though research is being conducted to further insure the surviv-
ability of this important data, particularly violent accidents or re-
sulting fires frequently destroy the instrument or render it useless
for later evaluation.
3. Cockpit Voice Recorder-This device is operationally similar
to the flight recorder, with the obvious distinction that the informa-
tion recorded is the totality of the communications taking place
among crewmembers and between crewmembers and ground per-
sonnel. This committee has the responsibility for preparing a tran-
script of this tape and an analysis of its contents. It should be
pointed out that this device is subject to the same survivability
problems encountered in the use of the flight recorder.
4. Air Traffic Control Records-All air carrier flights must be
made on an IFR 4 flight plan. One of the prerequisites for this type
"Id. § 121.343 (a) (1).
"4Instruments Flight Rules.
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of flight is the capability for continuous two-way radio communica-
tions between the aircraft and Air Traffic Control personnel on the
ground, who continuously monitor the progress of the flight by
radar and provide instructions for the proper conduct of the flight.
Just as the cockpit voice recorder records conversations in the air-
craft, a similar recorder on the ground chronologically records all
communications between the aircraft and Air Traffic Control per-
sonnel. It is the function of this committee to provide transcripts
and analysis of relevant communications, to analyze both the activi-
ties and the procedures used by Air Traffic Control personnel in-
volved, and to determine the adequacy of all navigational and
radar facilities involved.
5. Meteorological Records-This committee is responsible for
reviewing the general meteorological environment of the entire
route of flight, whether the information made available to the
aircrew was factually correct, and whether, in analyzing synoptic
conditions, the forecaster provided the aircrew with reasonably
accurate information.
6. Human Factors-Because of the complexity of modem avia-
tion equipment, the speeds at which it operates, and the fact that
a deteriorating situation cannot be remedied simply by stopping,
there exists a reasonable probability that some human failure oc-
curred at some point in the chain of events leading to an acci-
dent. This is not to infer that these "human failures," if they in
fact occurred, were the primary cause of the accident. Today's
flight crews are far too competent for any failure on their behalf
to be automatically assumed. Rather, because of the stress that a
situation will generate, procedurally perfect responses by all in-
dividuals involved cannot be realistically expected. This commit-
tee has the responsibility for determining whether any such errors
did occur, and if so, whether they contributed to the accident. In
making this determination, attention must be given to the medical
background and psychological data available on all personnel, air-
crew or otherwise, who were involved with the accident. This com-
mittee may also be asked to evaluate the accident concerning pos-
sibilities for rescue, evacuation, and survival.
7. Operations-This committee is responsible for analyzing the
operational conduct of the flight, which is primarily an analysis
1976]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
of the preflight planning done by the aircrew. Also included are
aircrew scheduling by the carrier and equipment performance data.
8. Maintenance History and Records-The function of this com-
mittee is to review the maintenance history of the aircraft both as
a whole and as compared with that of the same type aircraft.
Maintenance information must be kept on all aircraft, and the
specific requirements for carrier aircraft are particularly stringent
and complex. This investigation may, and frequently does, go back
as far as the manufacturer's developmental history of the aircraft
in a search for recurrent problems or trends, either with that type
aircraft or with this particular aircraft.
9. Structures-This committee is responsible for an analysis of
the structural breakdown of the aircraft, and, from an investiga-
tion of as much of the structure as is available, it is to ascertain
whether structural failure was a possible contributing factor.
Models of the aircraft can be utilized in addition to tests per-
formed on the same type aircraft. An attempt is made to provide
an accurate break-up pattern through an analysis of wreckage
distribution.
10. Aircraft Systems-The function of this committee is to
analyze the evidence relating to each aircraft subsystem, with the
exception of structures and powerplants. This area of responsibility
is quite broad, covering all the communications and navigation sys-
tems, life support systems, flight control systems, and hydraulic and
pneumatic systems.
11. Powerplants-The engines of an aircraft, while actually a
subsystem within the same broad category as those in section 10
above, are so inherently important to the safe operation of any
aircraft that they receive special treatment. This committee is to
analyze the remains to determine whether the engine(s) were
operating normally at the time of the accident. This committee may
also be called upon, at the instance of one or more of the other
committees, to determine at what power setting the engines were
operating at the time of the accident.'
Upon conclusion of the investigation, a preliminary report is
written. These preliminary reports are then made available to each
11 For a complete discussion of these committees, see generally Levy, The Role
of Federal Investigation in an Aircraft Accident Case, 18 PRAc. LAw. 65 (March
1972) [hereinafter Levy].
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committee member for comments, additions, and corrections. Each
committee then submits a final written report to the investigator-
in-charge."6
Following the field investigation phase of the accident, a public
hearing "may" 7 be held by the Board. This determination is en-
tirely within the discretion of the Board, limited only by what the
Board "deem(s) necessary in the public interest."38 The purpose of
the public hearing, if held, is "[to create] a public record of the
facts, conditions, and circumstances relating to the accident.""
9
The hearing was conceived to be primarily a "factfinding proceed-
ing," non-adjudicatory in nature, and thus not an adversary pro-
ceeding in the generally accepted sense of the term.
The Board of Inquiry, which conducts the public hearing, con-
sists of a member of the NTSB as Chairman, the Hearing Officer,
the Director of the Bureau of Aviation Safety and the General
Counsel or their designees. It is the stated purpose of this Board,
in conducting the hearings, to determine all the facts bearing on
probable cause of the accident and from which future corrective
action may be formulated."' The powers of the Board of Inquiry
which are important for the purposes of this article are to desig-
nate parties to the hearing, to terminate the hearing apparently at
will, to pass on the admissability of evidence, to determine gener-
ally what course the hearing will take, ' to issue subpoenas, and to
designate members of the technical panel. Here again, only those
designated as parties to the hearing may participate in the ques-
tioning of witnesses. The parties selected need not necessarily be
those same parties who participated in the field investigation. The
only criteria stated for selection as a party are:
IT]hose persons, Government agencies, companies and associa-
tions who participated in the field investigation or whose special
knowledge and aeronautical skills will contribute to the develop-
ment of pertinent evidence.a
- 49 C.F.R. § 431.10 (1971).
-37 Id. 431.20.
8Id. 5 431.21.




' Id. 5 431.27(a).
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Conspicuous once more by its absence is any allowance for rep-
resentation by those individuals injured or killed in the accident.
The power to terminate the hearing at will is important because
the objectives of the Board of Inquiry may well differ from the ob-
jectives of those injured. The Board of Inquiry is interested in
determining the primary cause of the accident and thus may not
fully develop the responsibility for that cause. Consequently, the
hearing could well be terminated prior to the time when any evi-
dence bearing on liability had been presented and properly made a
part of the record.
The power to determine the admissability of evidence, unham-
pered by any of the rules of evidence so familiar to an attorney
is, simply put, the power to determine not only the outcome of
the hearing, but also, to a large extent, the outcome of the entire
investigation. ' A power equally as pervasive as that dealing with
evidence is the power to regulate the course of the hearing. More
precisely, this is the power to determine not only the particular
sub-area upon which witnesses will be allowed to testify, but the
scope and depth of that testimony. Thus, testimony concerning
an area of potential interest to future litigants may be preemptively
foreclosed with neither their knowledge nor consent.
The power to issue subpoenas is vested in the Hearing Officer
and extends to subpoenas duces tecum. The power to designate
the Technical Panel resides in the Director of the Bureau of Avia-
tion Safety. The Technical Panel is composed primarily of NTSB
technical personnel who served as committee chairmen during
the field investigation phase. Though not required," the Board
ordinarily gives personal notice of the pendency of the hearing to
all known interested persons and also publicizes the hearing by a
press release to aviation trade journals and to local newspapers
near the scene of the accident.
A pre-hearing conference is then held, at which the Board of
Inquiry and the parties to the hearing, after having been provided
with copies of the proposed exhibits and witnesses, decide upon
the witnesses to be heard and the area and scope of the examina-
4§d. §§ 431.29(b), 431.30.
- Id. § 431.26.
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tion of each.' There is no provision making copies of the pro-
posed exhibits available to future litigants. The basic injustice of
this arrangement is very aptly expressed by the following:
The potential defendants are participants, are given free copies
of the exhibits, and help determine the course of the hearing in
advance of the hearing; the passengers and their representatives are
barred from even attending the pre-hearing conference."'
Even though ample and concise provision is made whereby parties
are to receive copies of the exhibits prior to the hearing, copies
of these same exhibits are unavailable to the public until concur-
rently introduced at the hearing. Bearing in mind the highly tech-
nical nature of these documents, it is probable that passengers'
representatives will be unable to comprehend adequately the tes-
timony, thus increasing the difficulties they face in developing
usable and admissible evidence.
The hearing itself is typical of those designed and intended to
gather facts. The witnesses are questioned by the technical panel
before the remaining parties to the hearing have an opportunity
to do so. As a result of the pre-hearing conference, the questioning
and introduction of exhibits should proceed along a well-program-
med route, in spite of the fact that witnesses may include anyone
even remotely concerned with the accident. The only criterion is
that each witness have information at his disposal bearing on the
probable cause of the accident and not otherwise available to the
Board of Inquiry. The length of the hearing will depend primarily
upon the conclusiveness of the field investigation. If the cause of
the accident was easily determinable and confficting evidence did
not render the investigation unusually complex and involved, the
hearing itself will be short and uninvolved. If, however, there is
no obvious component failure or other clear cause, the hearing
will undoubtedly be protracted, highly technical and, in view of
its purposes, of questionable usefulness. Its usefulness is suspect
under such circumstances since the same parties who participate
in the public hearing generally were also the major participants in
the field investigation; thus, if conclusive results were available,
they would certainly have been included in the committee's report
-Id. § 431.28.
41 Levy at 71.
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and would not have required development at the public hearing.
Finally, a complete transcript of the hearing is available," as are
the exhibits, which can be certified as official records for use in any
subsequent litigation.
The final phase of an aircraft accident investigation, the "anal-
ysis phase," essentially begins at the conclusion of the public
hearing. At this point, the Board invites interested persons, non-
parties included, to "submit recommendations as to the proper
conclusions to be drawn from the testimony and exhibits submitted
at the hearing."' The Board then considers all the information at
its disposal, composes a draft of the final report, and forwards this
draft to the Bureau of Aviation Safety for comment and revision,
and to the Director for review. Finally, it is submitted to the NTSB
Board members for their approval.
The final Board report, like the decision to hold public hear-
ings, is a matter entirely within the discretion of the Board, which
"[may] issue a detailed narrative accident report in connection
with the inquiry into those aircraft accidents which the Board de-
termines to warrant such a report."" (Emphasis added). If a final
report is issued, it will include the facts, conditions and circum-
stances leading up to the accident which bear on the determination
of the probable cause of the accident, recommendations for future
operational changes, and a determination of the probable cause
of the accident.
THE POLICY QUESTION
It is axiomatic that the NTSB policy, indeed its reason for ex-
istence, is to minimize the occurrence of aircraft accidents. In
effectuating this policy, a choice must necessarily be made between
the conflicting interests of two groups, those of the flying public-
at-large in preventing the occurrence of future accidents, and those
of the individuals killed or injured as a result of the accident in
having access to information required to fix liability. Implicit
throughout the sections of the Code of Federal Regulations deal-
ing with the NTSB are the results of that choice: to protect at
4749 C.F.R. § 831.32 (1975).
4SId. § 831.31.
-1d. § 831.35.
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practically all costs the interests of the public-at-large. This is com-
mendable at first glance. Closer examination, however, reveals
serious conceptual shortcomings.
Firstly, there is little evidence that the choice was made with the
interests of the public-at-large in mind. In fact, aside from their
own rhetoric, there is little to indicate that the choice did not fall to
the industry. It is certainly not clear what the concern for the public
was prior in time to the choice of investigatory method. If the
NTSB had indeed given priority to the public interest, then they
should have proceeded inductively to arrive at a method of inves,
tigation. Rather than following this procedure, it is reasonably
clear even to the casual observer that the NTSB is simply justify-
ing a method which has been passed down to it by its predecessors.
Secondly, if this choice of investigative method was in fact made
by NTSB, then NTSB appears further to have assumed that the
public-at-large would not be served by permitting plaintiff's par-
ticipation in an investigatory proceeding. This is a highly ques-
tionable assumption, particularly because numerous other groups,
each with its own interest to protect, play the major roles in acci-
dent investigation. These groups include, but are not limited to,
pilot's interest groups, equipment manufacurers, and those gov-
ernment agencies servicing the industry. Thus, it further appears
that the NTSB has assumed that these interest groups agree that
the interest of the public-at-large is paramount, exceeding even their
own, and that these groups will actively assist the NTSB in fur-
thering and protecting the interests of the public-at-large. These
assumptions are questionable at best." The NTSB, however, goes
even further down this questionable path by assuming that it will
be in its own best interests to protect these other parties from ad-
verse publicity,"1 because, if so protected, they will be more candid
and helpful during the investigatory stage. To implement this as-
sumption, the NTSB attempts to make privileged any testimony
these parties may give."
It should now be apparent that the major fault of the present
investigatory policy lies not in the policy choice itself, but rather
5°See generally, M. Mintz & J. Cohen, AMERICA, INC. (1970); R. Heilbroner,
IN THE NAME OF PROFrr (1972).
5149 C.F.R. 5 831.15 (1975).
52 Id. S§ 431.7, 831.15.
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in its implementation. To this end, it should properly be asked: is
it fair and just that one interested party should be systematically
excluded, while all the others are active participants?
Keeping firmly in mind the preferential treatment accorded the
industry, which has been outlined above, consideration should be
given to two questions: (1) in light of past corporate action ad-
verse to the public interest," is it reasonable to predicate the suc-
cess of such an important function on what in many instances is
essentially corporate goodwill adverse to its own interests?; and
(2) even if the corporations or agencies historically involved have
proved worthy of this trust, what ensures their future performance?
THE CRITIQUE
The failure to implement an investigatory procedure which will
protect the vital interests of all parties is due largely to a hereto-
fore unrecognized inconsistency between the procedures of the
NTSB and its historical foundation. The history of the NTSB indi-
cates clearly that, if there is one thing generally thought of as essen-
tial to the proper functioning of an air accident investigative
branch, it is the total independence of that branch. This, in turn,
can be achieved only by its divorce from any possible source of
coercion."M In fact, it was recognizedV as early as 1938 that it
would be unrealistic to expect an agency to indulge in self-criticism
and find fault with its own performance during the investigation of
an air accident. This position has also been taken in the following
pointed statement by Frederick B. Lee of the National Aeronautic
Pilots Association:
We do not feel it is proper that any Board, no matter what me-
chanism was used to insure its 'independence,' could ever be
wholly objective in an accident investigation in which their de-
partment or agency was involved."
Procedures indicate, however, that the supposed independence of
"' See generally, the sources at note 50 supra.
" Comment, Evidentiary Immunity of CAB Accident Records and Reports,
25 J. AIR L. & CoM. 235 (1958).
,' Senate Hearings at 1971.
ld. at 211.
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the NTSB is in fact an illusion; one which pays only "lip service"
to the concept of independence.
Is a higher standard of objectivity to be expected of a manu-
facturer than of a government agency? Since by the weight of pub-
lic opinion, an agency could not be trusted to judge itself, it appears
incongruous that the NTSB has put manufacturers and other parties
in interest in exactly that position. Thus, it is difficult to conceive
of a policy more internally inconsistent than this major agency
policy, which is specifically grounded on the questionable founda-
tion that the assumed goodwill and fair play of major corporations
will allow them to function objectively in areas of obvious self-
interest. It is a matter of some concern that an inconsistency which
casts such a long shadow over the entire arena of aircraft accident
investigation should have gone unrecognized for so long. Why did
not the Board itself, when promulgating its regulations, look be-
hind its procedures to see that its actions were accomplishing what
was most feared in the Senate hearings: an absolute conflict of in-
terest within the framework of the investigating unit. One com-
mentator early remarked
the fact is that there are adverse interests represented on the in-
vestigation committees and participating in the investigation, whose
opposing evaluation and conclusions may be sharp in their differ-
ences and important, depending upon the circumstances of the
accident."'
There is the possibility that this inclusion of adverse parties was
not an oversight, but rather was the manifestation of a policy de-
cision that the interests of those killed or injured were so "identical"
or closely aligned with those of the corporate/agency parties as to
assure adequate protection of their interests during all phases of
the investigation. When, however, one considers that the corporate/
agency parties are interested in the investigation only to the extent
of proving themselves free from liability,"' the trace of logic respon-
sible for the present set of circumstances becomes more remote.
5 Whitehead, Civil Aeronautics Board Accident Investigation Hearings-Boon
or Bane, 28 INSURANCE COUNSEL JOURNAL 258 (April 1961).
11 "Despite the Board's instructions that parties are not to divulge information
obtained by them during the investigation it is not unusual to see one of the par-
ties issuing public statements in an effort to lessen the public criticism directed
at it." Levy at 70.
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Additionally, the courts have found the regulations of the NTSB
to be unduly restrictive in some instances of disclosure of accident
investigation information. Section 435.4 of the Regulations,' en-
titled "Disclosure of Information by Testimony in Suits or Actions
for Damages Arising Out of Aircraft Accidents," deals directly
with this issue, and states in pertinent part: "Section 701 (e) of the
Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. 1441[e]) precludes the use of
the Board's reports in any suit or action for damages arising out
of an accident."'" (Emphasis added). However, in Lobel v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc.," the court, in allowing the admission of the
report testimony of the manufacturer's investigator, who had been
a member of the investigative team, limited the scope and applic-
ability of Section 1441 (e) to those reports containing opinions or
conclusions about possible causes of the accident. The court further
stated that the report in question
consisted wholly of the investigator's personal observations ...
There were in the report no opinions or conclusions about pos-
sible causes of the accident or defendant's negligence; there were
no findings based on interviews or anything but personal observa-
tions.62
Effectively, as a consequence of this decision, the only report re-
maining within the ambit of Section 1441 (e) is the final Board
report, in which conclusions are drawn and the determination of
probable cause made. 3 This interpretation of Section 1441 (e) was
relied upon and extended somewhat by the court in Berguido v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc.°" In Berguido the defendant attempted to ex-
clude report testimony on the basis that Lobel had established a
rule which prohibited an investigator from testifying to anything
except his personal observations. The court, in disposing of this
argument, stated that "[T]he primary thrust of (section 1441 (e))
5949 C.F.R. 835.3(g) (1975).
6049 U.S.C. 14 4 1(e) (1971) states: "No part of any report . .. of the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board relating to any accident thereof, shall be ad-
mitted as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages growing out of the
matter mentioned in such report... "
" Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 945 (1952).
12 Id. at 220.
See generally, Israel v. United States, 247 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1957).
°4 Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 317 F.2d 628 (3rd Cir. 1963).
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is to exclude CAB reports which express agency views as to the
probable cause of the accident."'" Of further interest in Berguido
was the court's analysis of the policy basis for section 1441 (e),
which the court found
to be a compromise between the interests of those who would
adopt a policy of absolute privilege (with regard to air accident
investigation testimony) in order to insure full and frank disclosure
as to the probable cause and thus help prevent future accidents
and the countervailing policy of making available all accident in-
formation to litigants in a civil suit."
A more concise statement of the divergent interests with which
this single policy must cope would be difficult to construct.
The Regulations also make provision for regulating the oral testi-
mony of both present and former employees as opposed to investi-
gators. Section 435.4" generally prohibits, subject to limited ex-
ceptions, the testimony of both employees and former employees
relating to information obtained in the course of their official duties.
When, however, an appropriate showing has been made that facts
cannot otherwise be obtained, employees!' may testify only as to
facts they actually observed in the course of the accident investiga-
tion.' In addition, employees are allowed to utilize their factual
reports, but only to refresh their memories."0 Testimony by deposi-
tion and written interrogatories is permitted." Finally, when an em-
ployee has been subpoenaed, the General Counsel, after notifica-
tion by the Director, will arrange with the court to excuse the em-
ployee from testifying."
In Falk v. United States" the court held that, contrary to the
provisions of 14 C.F.R. section 435.4, noted above, the oral opin-
ion of an investigator could and would be compelled. The court
reasoned that "in light of recent federal legislation which provides
In Id. at 632.
"6 Id. at 63 1.
749 C.F.R. S 835.3, 835 (1975).
"s Again, the reference is to present and former employees.




'sFalk v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 113 (D.C. Conn. 1971).
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that such reports are public documents, and, therefore, are open to
inspection by all litigants ... "' there is no valid reason to hold
that such oral opinion, otherwise available, should here be privi-
leged. ' The "recent federal legislation" referred to by the court
in Falk, is 49 U.S.C. section 1654(e), which provides: "Except as
otherwise provided by statute, the Board shall make public all re-
ports, orders, decisions, rules and regulations issued pursuant to
subsections (b) (1) and (b) (2) of this section ... " Section
1654(b) (1) provides:
There are hereby transferred to, and it shall be the duty of the
Board to exercise, the functions, powers and duties transferred to
the Secretary by section 1655 of this title and section 8 of this Act
with regard to-
(1) determining the cause or probable cause of transportation
accidents and reporting the facts, conditions and circumstances
relating to such accidents.""
It should be noted that while such legislation renders the desired
information more readily available, earlier courts had effected
much the same result without the benefit of such legislation. Two
such cases are Ritts v. American Overseas Airlines, Inc." and Uni-
versal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc." In Ritts, the court,
in construing section 701 (e) of the Civil Aeronautics Act," stated
that the section did not prohibit "the use of the testimony of
a witness examined by the Board in the course of the investiga-
tion."8 The same result was reached in Universal Airlines, primarily
74 1d. at 114.
75 Cf. Craig v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 40 F.R.D. 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), an
admiralty case.
71 Cf. McFadden v. AVCO Corp., 278 F. Supp. 57, 59 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
77 Ritts v. American Overseas Airlines, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
71 Universal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern Air Line, Inc., 188 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.
1951).
71 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, S 701(e), 52 Stat. 973, states, "The
records and reports of the (Air Safety) Board shall be preserved in the custody
of the secretary of the Authority in the same manner and subject to the same pro-
visions respecting publication as the records and reports of the Authority except
that any publication thereof shall be styled 'Air Safety Board of the Civil Aero-
nautics Authority,' and that no part of any report or reports of the Board or the
Authority relating to any accident, or the investigation thereof, shall be admitted
as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter
mentioned in such report or reports."
80 97 F. Supp. at 458.
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through a reliance on Ritts. The court stated that:
[W]e may add that in any case where the CAB investigator is the
sole source of evidence reasonably available to the parties, ... we
deem it incumbent upon the Civil Aeronautics Authority to make
his testimony available by deposition or in person; if the deposi-
tion is not forthcoming or is insufficient, the Court has the power
to order his personal attendance. 1
The court in Universal Airlines, however, did foreclose the ques-
tion of whether the investigators could be compelled "to produce
any of the Board's reports, orders, or private files or to testify as to
the contents of such private papers,"" in favor of the Board. This
decision had the effect of limiting testimony to personal knowledge,
recollections, and records. The rule changes somewhat where the
government is a party to the resulting litigation. Courts have ruled,
in Evans v. United States" and in Oresmer v. United States," that
non-privileged records of an investigation; those containing no con-
clusions as to probable cause or future recommendations, are dis-
coverable as against any party.
The effect of the Freedom of Information Act' on the question
of information availability from NTSB has yet to be fully compre-
hended.86 The Regulations specifically make the FIA applicable to
Part 401, dealing with information availability," while at the same
time specifically making the FIA inapplicable to the public hear-
ing.8" This would seem to indicate at least a partial acceptance by
the NTSB of prior court decisions limiting the authority of the
NTSB to be the final arbiter of when and under what circumstances
certain information should be made public. The Board, however,
if only by the weight of its own regulations, is still vested with
81 188 F.2d at 999.
82 Id. at 1000.
83 Evans v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 255 (W.D. La. 1950).
84 Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).
SFreedom of Information Act, 81 Stat. 54 (June 5, 1967), amending, 5
U.S.C. 5 552 (Supp. 1966), formerly 80 Stat. 250 (1966). [hereinafter FIA].
8 For a complete discussion of the applicability of the FIA to the records and
testimony of NTSB, see generally, Florsheim, Administrative Law-Aircraft Ac-
cident Investigation Records-Freedom of Information Act, 33 J. Am L. & COM.
490 (1967) [hereinafter Florsheim].
87 14 C.F.R. § 401.1(a) (1975).
88 Id. § 431.20.
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considerable discretion in a section to which the courts have not
yet spoken:
Section 1504 of Title 49, United States Code, authorizes the
Board to order certain information withheld from public disclosure
when in its own judgment a disclosure of such information would
adversely affect the interests of a person and is not required in
the interest of the public. All information ordered by the Board to
be held confidential under this section will not be disclosed to the
public; and, in addition, the Board has determined that it will not
be in the interest of the public to disclose. . . . (iii) any cockpit
voice recorder tape or transcription thereof, in the custody of the
Board, except for a transcription of those communications deter-
mined by the Board to be pertinent and relevant to the accident,
and which will be placed in the Board's public docket of such acci-
dent." (Emphasis added).
Numerous other categories of "Information Exempted From Dis-
closure""° exist, but none allow for the broad exercise of discretion
provided for in section 1504.
Provision is, however, made within the Regulations whereby any
decision by the Chairman not to make requested information avail-
able "is considered a refusal by the Board for the purposes of Sec-
tion 3(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act."" Section 3(c)
of the APA is the FIA, which in turn makes available a more than
adequate procedure for judicial review of such a refusal, in that
"the disclosure action authorized will take precedence over all
other cases on the Court's docket, unless the Court deems other
cases of greater importance." 2 Thus, even though the grant of dis-
cretion is broad, perhaps unnecessarily so, there is at least an ade-
quate remedy for the abuse of that discretion.
It further appears that, even though the FIA provides "[elach
agency . . . shall make available for public inspection and copy-
ing (A) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opin-
ions. . . ," at least the final report of the NTSB will remain privi-
leged. This results because section 4(b) (3)4 of the FIA provides
89 1d. § 401.20(2).
"Id. Part 401, Subpart D.
9 1 Id. Part 401, Subpart E. 5 401.25(e).
0' Florsheim at 491.
"FIA § 2(2) (A).
4Id. § 4(b)(3).
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that the FIA is not applicable to records and other information
specifically made privileged by other statutes. And, since in Ritts,
Universal Airline, Lobel and Berguido the courts have construed
section 701 (e) to apply to final reports, it is reasonable to assume
that any court dealing with precisely this issue would find section
101 (e) within the ambit of section 4(b)(3) of the FIA.
As a consequence, the FIA has yet to accomplish substantive
changes when applied to the NTSB. Its chief credits to date have
been to make many of the investigative records available as a mat-
ter of right, and to provide for effective and speedy judicial review
of a refusal to honor a request for information. At least as note-
worthy are the specific exemptions from disclosure which are made
a part of the act. For example, while industry investigative reports
are not exempt, reports by government investigators are exempt be-
cause they are considered intra-agency communications."' Thus, in-
formation from what could be considered the only unbiased source
taking part in the investigation is exempted. Additionally investiga-
tive records and files compiled in connection with agency adjudica-
tive procedures are exempted."
CONCLUSION
In a time when air travel has grown to a major industry of world-
wide proportions it is too easy to rationalize a decision denying
individual rights on the basis of greater public welfare and protec-
tion. To maintain adequate individual protections in the face of
such pressure, the NTSB should re-examine its posture regarding
availability of information, but also more importantly, the designa-
tion of parties to the investigation and hearing. Thought should be
given to the creation of an in-house technical staff competent to
deal with the investigative tasks now performed out of necessity by
the manufacturers themselves. At a minimum, the Regulations
should be rewritten to allow equal representation to the parties in
interest. This solution, however, would be cumbersome within the
existing investigative framework.
In the final analysis, perhaps it is in the best interests of all
parties concerned to terminate the procedure as it now exists, re-
Id. S 4(b) (5).
Jd. § 4(b)(7).
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placing it with an independent, adequately-staffed government in-
vestigative team whose personnel and findings would be made avail-
able to be placed in evidence at a public hearing of an adversary
nature before the NTSB. Thus, liability could be fixed with neither
party having an unfair advantage. Although this would not neces-
sarily be a perfect system, it would allow the representatives of
every person killed on that 747 equal representation and access
to information vital to the assertion of their rights. The present pro-
cedures do not accomplish this important result.
